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SHRINK MISSOURI, CAMPAIGN FINANCE,
AND "THE THING THAT WOULDN'T
LEAVE"
Richard L. Has en*
During one of the first seasons of Saturday Night Live, perhaps in 1976, the "Not Ready for Prime Time Players" satirized
trailers for horror movies. Along with "The Island of Lost Luggage," the skit featured a trailer for "The Thing That Wouldn't
Leave." John Belushi played a party guest who planted himself
on the living room couch after all the other guests had left.
When Belushi, shoving his face full of potato chips, announced
that he was going to make a long distance phone call, party hostess Jane Curtin gave a blood-curdling scream.
The year 1976 was also when the United States Supreme
Court decided Buckley v. Valeo, 1 which, among other things, upheld limits on campaign contributions but struck down limits on
campaign expenditures. The per curiam opinion was drafted
hastily to be in time for the 1976 elections and featured additional separate opinions from five of the eight Justices who participated.2 Members of the Court have since criticized various
aspects of the opinion, including its decision to judge campaign
contribution limits by a different standard than campaign expenditure limits. 3 Yet despite such criticism, nearly 25 years later
* Professor and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. B.A., 1986, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., 1988, J.D., 1991, Ph.D. (Political Science), 1992,
University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to Richard Briffault, David Burcham, Hal
Krent, Chris May, Roy Schotland, and Adam Winkler for useful comments and suggestions. I presented an earlier version of this Article at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in Washington D.C., August 31-Septembcr 4, 2000.
Thanks to participants there, especially commentators Michael Fitts and Michael Mal bin,
for sharing their thoughts.
I. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
2. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist
wrote separate opinions. Justice Stevens did not participate in the case.
3. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm 'n v. National Conservmive Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 518-19 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Austin v. Michigan Stale
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Burger made the same point in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Buckley itself.
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and many years after the death of John Belushi, Buckley truly
has become "The Thing That Wouldn't Leave." Buckley has
appeared to be an immovable object, despite numerous challenges from many directions. 4
Perhaps change is finally coming. This past term, the Supreme Court decided Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC. 5
Shrink Missouri upheld against First Amendment challenge a
Missouri law limiting individual campaign contributions to
statewide candidates to $1,075. The outcome of the case is unremarkable following Buckley's decision to uphold the federal
contribution limit of $1,000, but the reasoning in Shrink Missouri
is quite significant. In four separate ways, the Court in Shrink
Missouri lowered the constitutional bar for laws limiting campaign contributions. The Court: (1) ratcheted down the level of
scrutiny applicable to contribution limit challenges; (2) expanded
the definition of "corruption" and "the appearance of corruption" necessary to sustain contribution limits; (3) lowered the
evidentiary burden for a government defending contribution
limits; and ( 4) created a very difficult test for those challenging a
contribution limit amount as unconstitutionally low. In combination, the opinion shows dramatic new deference toward contribution limits.
A key question remaining open after Shrink Missouri is the
extent to which this deference signals a broader willingness of
the Court to allow regulation of campaign finance. The case
may be read in two ways. One reading, supported by the Court's
careful limiting language, is that Buckley is alive and well. Under this reading, Shrink Missouri is simply the Court's latest
pronouncement that, following Buckley, contribution limits generally are constitutional. Shrink Missouri then pairs well with
the second most recent Supreme Court campaign finance case,
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission. 6 In Colorado Republican, the Supreme
Court, following Buckley, affirmed a political party's right to

424 U.S. at 241 ("'For me contributions and expenditures arc two sides of the same First
Amendment coin'').
4. Sec Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance, The Parties, and the Court: A Commellt on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 14 Const. Comm. 91, 125-26 (1997) (suggesting that Buckley will remain viable
precedent despite sustained challenge).
5. 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
6. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). For a comprehensive and thoughtful commentary on the
case, see Briffault, 14 Const. Comm. at 120-26 (cited in note 4).
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make unlimited independent expenditures for or against a particular candidate.
The second reading of the case is that the Court is preparing
to erect in place of Buckley a jurisprudence more hospitable to
campaign finance regulation. The majority opinion never says
this explicitly, but the message comes through implicitly in the
Court's discussion and is supported explicitly by the concurring
opinions.
We probably will not learn whether the first or second interpretation of Shrink Missouri is correct until Supreme Court
personnel changes. Nonetheless, even if the Court opts for the
first reading in the near term, each day the Buckley status quo
grows increasingly untenable given the explosive growth in the
campaign finance loopholes of "issue advocacy" and "soft
money," a point Justice Kennedy raised in his Shrink Missouri
dissent. 7 Loopholes have eviscerated much of Buckley's force, a
fact the entire Court should recognize eventually. At the same
time, reformers continue to push Buckley-challenging campaign
finance proposals through state and local legislative bodies and,
more often, through the initiative process. These trends should
move the Court either to adopt the second interpretation of
Shrink Missouri or to move in the far opposite direction as urged
by Justice Thomas, 8 barring any contribution or expenditure
limit, but perhaps upholding campaign finance disclosure laws.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the background of the Shrink Missouri case in light of Buckley and other
precedent. Part II explains how the majority of the Shrink Missouri Court significantly lowered the bar for constitutional scrutiny of campaign contribution limits and briefly recounts the
other opinions of the Justices in the case. Part III sets forth and
assesses the competing interpretations of Shrink Missouri's larger significance. It argues that current campaign finance reality
has overtaken Buckley's assumptions, suggesting that one way or
another, Buckley is likely to leave America's living room in the
not-too-distant future.

7.
8.

Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at '114 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at '116-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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I. BUCKLEY, THE LOW CONTRIBUTION LIMIT CASES,
AND THE BACKGROUND OF SHRINK MISSOURI
9

In brief, Buckley upheld various contribution limits contained in the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Elections Campaign Act ("FECA"), including a $1,000 limit on individual conIt also struck down
tributions to federal candidates. 10
expenditure limits, including a $1,000 limit on independent expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate. 1
Although recognizing that any law regulating campaign financing was subject to the "exacting scrutiny required by the
First Amendment," 12 the Court mandated divergent treatment
of contributions and expenditures for two reasons. First, the
Court held that campaign expenditures were core political
speech, but a limit on the amount of campaign contributions
only marginally restricted a contributor's ability to send a message of support for a candidate. 13 Thus, expenditures were entitled to greater constitutional protection than contributions. Second, the Buckley Court recognized only the interests in
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption as
justifying infringement on First Amendment rights. 14 The Court
held that large contributions raise the problem of corruption
"[ t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders .... " 15 But truly independent expenditures do not raise the
same danger of corruption because a quid pro quo is more difficult if politician and spender cannot communicate about the expenditure.16 Finally, the Court rejected a proposed equality rationale for limiting expenditures, finding the idea "wholly
9. This part provides only brief background on those parts of Buckley necessary to
put the Shrink Missouri issues in perspective; it is not meant to be a complete treatment.
For more comprehensive analysis of current campaign finance law, see Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, Election Law- Cases and Materials 509-797 (Carolina Academic Press,
1995), and Daniel H. Lowenstein and Richard L. Hasen. Election Law-2000-2001 Supplement 76-147 (Carolina Academic Press, 2000).
10. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35.
II. !d. at 39-51.
12. !d. at 16.
13. !d. at 21.
\4. Sec Federal Election Comm 'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 496-497 (1985) ("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption
are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.")
15. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
16. Id. at 46-47. The Court also remarked that expenditure limits could be circumvented easily, meaning that such limits would serve "no substantial societal interest." !d.
at 45.
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foreign to the First Amendment." 17 Although various members
of the Court since have questioned the distinction between contributions and expenditures, 18 the Court has never disavowed the
distinction.
Significantly for purposes here, the Court in Buckley considered and rejected a challenge to the specific amount of the
contribution limits. The plaintiffs argued the amounts set were
not narrowly tailored to prevent corruption or its appearance.
In response, the Court approvingly quoted the lower court opinion, which stated that "a court has no scalpel to probe, whether,
say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." 19 The Supreme Court continued that "[s]uch distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind." 20 The Court also explained that the question was
whether the limits were so low as to prevent "candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. " 21
Following Buckley, especially in the 1990s, states and local
jurisdictions adopted campaign finance laws containing contribution limits at or below $1,000. Challengers to these laws argued
that the contribution limits were so low compared to the value of
$1,000 in 1976 dollars as to be a "difference in kind" from the
Buckley limits because the limits prevented candidates from
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. 22
Until Shrink Missouri, these challenges typically 23 met with
success in the lower courts. Courts struck down contribution
limits in Arkansas, 24 California/ 5 Minnesota, 26 Missouri, 27 and
17. !d. at 48-49.
18. Sec supra note 3.
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
20. ld.
21. ld. at 21.
22. See, e.g., Nalional Black Police Ass'n v. Dis£ric£ of Columbia Bd. of Elec£ions
and ££hies, 924 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated as moot, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
23. But sec Kemucky Righi 10 Life. Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 860 (1997) (holding that a "$1,000 limitation on direct contributions in connection with local and state elections in Kentucky is not different in kind
from the $1,000 limitation on direct contributions in connection with federal elections
upheld in Buckley.").
24. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1001
(1998), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1145 (1999).
25. California Prolife Council Polilica/ Ac1ion Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282,
1297 (E.D. Cal. 1998). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction on this issue but failed to reach the merits. 164 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999)
The litigation remains pending.
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Washington D.C. 28 on grounds they were unconstitutionally low.
Before the Court decided Shrink Missouri, I speculated that the
$1,000 FECA limit itself could be subject to challenge because
the limit was not indexed to inflation and was therefore worth
only a fraction of $1,000 in 1976 dollars. 29
Shrink Missouri started off as a typical low contribution limits case. In 1994, the Missouri legislature enacted campaign contribution limits ranging from $250 for local races to $1,000 for
statewide races, with the amounts indexed to inflation. 30 Before
the limits became effective, voters approved an initiative establishing even lower limits that overrode the legislatively set limits.
The Eijihth Circuit struck down the initiative limits in Carver v.
Nixon, ruling that the "limits amount to a difference in kind
from the limits in Buckler " 32 Carver effectively revived the legislatively-enacted limits, 3 which then faced challenge in Shrink
Missouri.
A political action committee, Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, and Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the 1998 Republican nomination for state auditor, challenged the contribution
limits in the state law. The PAC gave Fredman $1,025, the
maximum allowed by law as adjusted for inflation. "Shrink Missouri represented that, without the limitation, it would contribute more to the Fredman campaign. Fredman alleged he could
campaign effectively only with more generous contributions than
[the law] allowed. " 34
Although the district court held that the contribution limit
was not unconstitutionally low under Buckley, 35 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The
outcome itself was hardly a surprise given that the Eighth Circuit
had struck down other Missouri contribution limits in Carver as
26. Dav .-.Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), ccrt. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
27. Ca;~·er v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
28. National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics,
924 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated as moot, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
29. Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Just Gets Messier, Nat'! L.J. A21 (Nov. 2,
1998).
30. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,901-02 (2000).
31. 72 F.3d at 645.
32. !d. at 644.
33. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 901.
34. !d. at 902 (citation omitted).
35. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734,740 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
('"The Court finds that the effect of inflation since Buckley was decided has not created a
'difference in kind' between a $1,000 contribution in 1976, and a $1,075 contribution in
1998.").
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well as contribution limits in Minnesota 36 and Arkansas. 37 The
court's reasoning, however, was surprising.
Only one judge on the three-judge ~anel believed that the
$1,075 limit was unconstitutionally low. 8 But that judge was
joined by a second judge 39 in holding the contribution law unconstitutional because the state failed to provide "some demonstrable evidence that there were genuine problems that resulted
from contributions in amounts greater than the limits in place." 40
The majority rejected as "conclusory and self-serving" the affidavit of a Missouri legislator "that he and his colleagues believed
there was the 'real potential to buy votes' if the limits were not
enacted, and that contributions greater than the limits 'have the
appearance of buying votes. "' 41 The Court distinguished the evidence of corruption and its appearance that the Supreme Court
held sufficient to justify the contribution limits in Buckley,
namely "the perfidy that had been uncovered in federal campaign financing in 1972. " 42
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by a 6-3 vote,
reversed.
II. LOWERING THE BAR IN CONTRIBUTION LIMIT
CASES
A. THE MAJORITY LOWERS THE BAR

Justice Souter, writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor and Stevens, upheld
the Missouri contribution law. The Court held that the state
provided enough proof of corruption or the appearance of corruption to justify Missouri's contribution limits, and that the
amount of the contribution limits was not unconstitutionally
low. 43 Justices Stevens and Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg,

36. Day v. Holahan, 34 F3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), ccrt. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
37. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1001
(1998), and ccrt. denied, 525 U.S. 1145 (1998).
38. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519,520 (8th Cir. 1998).
39. Sec also id. at 523 (concurring opinion JOining in reversal of JUdgment but failing to join in that part of opinion .. finding that the contribution limits arc difkrcnt in
kind from those approved in Buckley~·. Valeo ... ) (citation omitted); id. at 524 (dissenting
opinion).
40. !d. at 521.
41. Id. at 522.
42. ld. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 n.2R).
43. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gm·'t PAC, 120 S. Ct. R97, 910 (2000).
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each wrote concurring opinions. Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, each dissented.
Although the majority characterized its opinion as a routine
application of Buckley, 44 the opinion in fact lowered the constitutional bar in contribution limit cases in four different ways.
Although one can read any of the four changes in isolation as either consistent with Buckley or merely small extensions of it, together they mark a significant departure in the direction of the
Court's willingness to tolerate campaign contribution laws. I list
these four changes in the order in which they appear in the Supreme Court opinion, not in order of importance. In fact, I believe the third and fourth changes listed are more significant
than the first and second changes.
(1) Ratcheting down the level of scrutiny. As noted above,
the Court in Buckley held that all campaign finance laws are subject to "exacting scrutiny" because of First Amendment concerns, but contribution limits were subject to somewhat less scrutiny than expenditure limits. Given the lack of clarity, some
lower courts had construed Buckley to mandate strict scrutiny
even for review of contribution limits. 45
The majority opinion in Shrink Missouri reexamined the
level of scrutiny to which contribution laws should be subject
and held the level to be low indeed. The Court began by noting
that "[p]recision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per
curiam opinion." 46 It then cited those portions of Buckley contrasting the interests at stake in contribution limit versus expenditure limit cases, 47 characterizing Buckley as saying, "in effect,
that limitin~ contributions left communication significantly unimpaired."4 After citing a few more Supreme Court campaign
finance cases,49 the Court explained that "[i]t has, in any event,
been plain ever since Buckley that contribution limits would
44. !d. ("There is no reason in logic or evidence to doubt the sufficiency of Buckley
to govern this case in support of the Missouri statute.").
45. See, e.g., Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1995). For a pre-Shrink
Missouri scholarly examination of the level of scrutiny question surrounding contribution
limits, see Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations and
the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 Hastings Canst. L.Q. 601,607-08 (1983).
46. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 903.
47. !d. at 903-04.
48. !d. at 904.
49. !d. (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986), and Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,610 (1996)).
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more readily clear the hurdles before them. " 50 The Court concluded that
under Buckley's standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit involving "significant interference" with associational rights ...
could survive if the Government demonstrated that contribution regulation was "closely drawn" to match a "sufficiently
important interest," ... though the dollar amount of the limit
51
need not be "fine tuned."

Justice Thomas in his dissent derided as "sui generis" the
majority's new "Buckley's standard of scrutiny," "which fails to
obscure the Court's ad hoc balancing away of First Amendment
rights. " 52 Whether or not one agrees with Justice Thomas that
the standard the Court always should apply in campaign finance
cases is strict scrutiny, 53 it is difficult to disagree with his conclusion that "the Court proceeds to apply something less-much
less- than strict scrutiny. " 54
The standard set by the Court differs in two ways from strict
scrutiny. First, the justification need only be "sufficiently important." Under this language courts could perhaps begin to accept
new and "non-compelling" interests (beyond the prevention of
corruption ~nd the appearance of corruption) to justify contribution limits. 5) Second, there need be no close relationship between the ends of the campaign finance law and the means. The
Court's explanation that "fine tuning" of contribution limits is
unnecessary is at odds with the idea of narrow tailoring as required by strict scrutiny. In sum, the words "exacting scrutiny"
used in Buckley may have suggested something like strict scrutiny, but the standard as explained in Shrink Missouri is considerably more deferential to government interests.
(2) Expanding the Definitions of "Corruption" and "the Appearance of Corruption." In Buckley, the Court recognized the
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption as a
constitutionally sufficient justification for contribution limits. 56
The Buckley Court spoke of the "integrity of our system of rep50. !d.
51. !d. (citation and internal alterations omitted).
52. !d. at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
53. !d. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54. !d. at 922 (Thomas. J., dissenting).
55. That will not be necessary, however, given how the Court has expanded the
definitions of corruption and the appearance of corruption and !owned the evidentiary
burden, as I explain below.
56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26.
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resentative democracy [being] undermined" "[t]o the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders. " 57 The Court continued, "Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large financial contributions." 58
The idea that corruption is equivalent to the quid pro quo,
or as the Court put it in a later case-"dollars for political favors"59 -seemed well enshrined in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In 1990, however, the Court in Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce 60 appeared to expand the definition of
corruption to include an equality-like 61 rationale. 62 There, the
Court upheld a limit on corporate expenditures in a candidate
campaign on grounds the law "aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation
to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas. " 63
Since Austin, the Court had not relied upon or even discussed this "New Corruption," 64 and some commt?ntators have
speculated that Austin might be an "aberration" 6 ' or merely a
''corporations case," 66 not generally applicable to campaign finance cases. The Court did not mention Austin in the Shrink
Missouri case either, but the majority opinion did seem to expand further both the definition of "corruption" and the "appearance of corruption."

57. !d. at 26.
58. !d. at 27.
59. Federal Elec1ion Comm 'n v. Nalional Conservmive Poli1ical ACiion Commiuee,
470 U.S. 480,497 (1985).
60. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
61. I explain why Auslin provides an equality-like rationale in Richard L. Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalilarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign
Finance Vouchers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. I, 40-42 (1996). But sec Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 133, 136 (1998) (arguing that the Court's concern about
"other people's money" drives its decision in Auslin).
62. Sec Lowenstein, Eleclion Law-Cases and Mmerials at 625 (cited in note 9)
(suggesting the Court first strayed from its definition of corruption in the Massachuseus
Cillzens for L1je case).
63. Auslin, 494 U.S. at 660.
64. The term is Justice Scalia's in his Auslin dissent. !d. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Daniel Havs Lowenstein, A Pauemless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and 1he Firsl
Amendmenl Afler Austin, 21 Cap. U. L. Rev. 381,383 (1992).
66. Briffault. 14 Const. Comm. at 125 (cited in note 4).
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Regarding corruption, the Court wrote, "In speaking [in
Buckley] of 'improper influence' and 'opportunities for abuse' in
addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,' we recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to
the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes
of large contributors. " 6 As for appearance of corruption, the
Court remarked, "Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance. " 68
The Court did not define further what it meant for politicians to be "too compliant with the wishes of large contributors"
or for large contributors to be (or simply appear to be but not
really be) "call[ing] the tune" absent a quid pro quo. Perhaps
the Court meant that politicians and large contributors would
make deals with "winks and nods" 69 rather than through an explicit quid pro quo, and campaign contribution limits work to
prevent this equivalent to bribery. More likely, the Court was
expressing the view that large campaign contributions buy access
to elected officials (or at least appear to do so), something objectionable in its own right (or at least objectionable to voters) even
if there is no quid pro quo or "political favor" given in return for
the money.
In any case, Shrink Missouri now stands for the proposition
that a law limiting campaign contributions is justified if it prevents politicians from being "too compliant with the wishes of
contributors" or if it prevents voters from believing politicians to
be too compliant even if this fact is untrue.
(3) Lowering the Evidentiary Burden. The expantion of the
definition of corruption would not be that significant if the Court
required hard proof that politicians are "too compliant with the
wishes of contributors" and that large contributors "call the
tune,'' or that voters believed they call the tune and that this belief undermined democratic legitimacy. Proof of corruption
would be hard to come by in most cases because such information likely would be hidden, given the potential political and legal ramifications. The Eighth Circuit took the position that contribution limit laws could not be sustained absent "some
67. Nixon~·. Shrink Missouri Gov'r PAC, !20 S. Ct. X97, 905 (2000).
68. !d. at 906.
69. Cf. Evans v. Unired Srares, 504 U.S. 255, 273 (I 992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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demonstrable evidence" of either corruption or of the erosion of
public confidence in the democratic system caused by the appearance of corruption. 70
The Eighth Circuit's position was not out in left field. The
Court has demanded such evidence in other First Amendment
cases, 71 and indeed demanded such evidence in Colorado Republican. In that case, the Court held that it would not simply assume, absent evidence, that all ~arty expenditures are coordinated with the party's candidates. 2
In Shrink Missouri, however, the Court required virtually
no evidence to support the government's claim that the limits
prevented corruption and the appearance of corruption. The
Court began by explaining that the "quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility
of the justification raised. Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large
contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible. " 73
Although the Court insisted that "mere conjecture" 74 was
not enough, it pointed to very little evidence actually supporting
the claim that the Missouri contribution limits were necessary to
prevent corruption or its appearance. First, the Court pointed to
the only evidence on the point put forward by the State, the affidavit from the Missouri legislator 75 who stated that "large contributions 'have the real potential to buy votes.'" 76 The Court
further mentioned newspaper accounts, cited in the district court
opinion, of possible corruption in Missouri politics. 77 Finally, the
Court cited the overwhelming voter approval of the contribution
limits initiative that the Eighth Circuit had struck down in
Carver v. Nixon: "[A]lthough majority votes do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections, the statewide vote on [the
initiative] certainly attested to the perception [of corruption] relied upon here." 78
70.
71.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Sec, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,664 (1994).
72. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604, 617-22 (1996). For a critique of this reasoning, see Briffault, 14 Const. Comm.
at 110-12 (cited in note 4).
73. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 906.
74. !d. at 907.
75. Sec supra note 41 and accompanying text.
76. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 907.
77. !d.
78. Id. at 908.

2000]

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

495

This evidence is pretty flimsy to support even the weakened
corruption/appearance idea that politicians are "too compliant
with the wishes of contributors" and the large contributors "call
the tune" (or that voters believe they call the tune). The affida79
vit of a single legislator of a "potential" for vote buying hardly
seems to be the requisite "quantum of empirical evidence
needed to meet heightened judicial scrutiny." Nor do newspaper
accounts that merely "support inferences of impropriety" rather
than impropriety itself go to show either a real danger of corruption or mass public perception of corruption. These newspaper
accounts, at least as described by the Court, did not point to a
single criminal investigation, much less a criminal conviction,
coming from alleged campaign finance improprieties: "One report questioned the state treasurer's decision to use a certain
bank for most of Missouri's banking business after that institution contributed $20,000 to the treasurer's campaign. Another
made much of the receipt by a candidate for state auditor of a
$40,000 contribution from a brewery and one for $20,000 from a
bank." 80
The overwhelming support for the Missouri campaign finance initiative cited by the Court as evidence of a widespread
perception of corruption instead could be evidence of voters' desire to level the electoral playing field, an equality rationale for
campaign finance reform. Moreover, the Court discussed no
evidence showing a causal link between even a widespread perception of corruption and any new unwillingness of voters "to
take part in democratic governance. " 81 This is a very different
attitude than the one the Court has shown in the past in reviewing this justification as applied to expenditure limits. In those
cases, the Court time and again rejected for lack of evidence
claims that campaign finance laws were necessary to preserve
voters' beliefs in the integrity of the political process. 82
79. On the power of the "vote buying" metaphor, set: Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (2000).
80. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 907 (citations omitted). To be fair, the Court also
citt:d to the Eighth Circuit's opinion in the Carver case and described Carver's citation of
newspaper articles discussing alleged criminal activity involving large campaign contributions. !d.
81. !d. at 906.
82. Sec, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, California, 454 U.S.
290, 299 (1981) ("the record in this case docs not support the California Supreme Court's
conclusion that § 602 is needed to preserve voters' confidence in the ballot measure
process"); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) ("If appellee's arguments were supported by rt:cord or legislative findings that corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather
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In the end, the Court accepted the government's claim of
"prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption" on
faith, not on evidence, believing that the point was virtually selfevident.83 Although commentators have characterized Buckley
itself as setting up a low evidentiary burden for review of campaign contribution limits, 84 after Shrink Missouri the burden is
almost non-existent.
(4) Creating a Difficult Test to Challenge the Amount of
Contribution Limits. Finally, the Shrink Missouri Court addressed the question of whether the dollar amounts in the Missouri contribution limits law were too low. The Court first noted
that the district court concluded that the limits did not appear to
prevent candidates from raising sufficient funds to run their
campaigns. 85 Then, after stating that over 97% of contributors
to state auditor candidates made contributions of $2,000 or less, 86
the Court held that it mattered little if plaintiff Fredman was ad-

than serving First Amendment interests. these arguments would merit our consideration.
But there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has
been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government.") (citations and footnote omitted); sec also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 499 (1985) (upholding district court's decision to exclude
evidence the FEC claimed showed actual corruption or the appearance of corruption
caused by unregulated PAC expenditures, including "evidence of high-level appointments in the Reagan administration of persons connected with the PACs and newspaper
articles and polls purportedly showing a public perception of corruption").
83. The Court left open the possibility that there might "be need for a more extensive evidentiary documentation if petitioners had made any showing of their own to cast
doubt on the apparent implications of Buckley's evidence and the record here." Shrink
Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 908. No doubt, lower court judges hostile to contribution limits
will seize on this language to distinguish Shrink Missouri. The Tenth Circuit, reviewing
Colorado Republican on remand after the Supreme Court decided Shrink Missouri, took
exactly this approach in holding that parties have a right to make unlimited coordinated
expenditures to candidates. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1233 n.9 (lOth Cir. 2000), ccrt. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296
(Oct 10, 2000). On the other hand, the First Circuit recently upheld Maine's new public
financing system, citing as evidence of the appearance of corruption little more than
press accounts suggesting that "large contributions have occurred in Maine and that
Maine citizens are concerned about their impact on lawmakers." Daggett v. Commission
on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F. 3d 445,457 (1st Cir. 2000).
84. Briffault, 14 Const. Comm. at 103-04 (cited in note 4).
85. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 908-09.
86. Id. at 909. But as Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent "the statistic provides
no assurance that Missouri's law has not reduced the resources supporting political
speech, since the largest contributors provide a disproportionate amount of funds." 120
S. Ct. at 925 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also pointed out that total spending plummeted in both the primary and general elections after Missouri's contribution
limits went into effect. The number of challengers to incumbents also declined. Id. at
925 n.lO. The majority upheld the contributions despite these effects, which suggests
these facts do not demonstrate a "system of suppressed political advocacy."
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versely affected by the inability to raise larger amounts of money
from fewer individuals: "[A] showing of one affected individual
does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that
would be unconstitutional under Buckley." 87 The Court thus focused on political speech in the aggregate, rather than on the individual rights of any particular candidate, contributor, or voter.
Perhaps most significantly, the Shrink Missouri Court then
refined Buckley for determining whether contribution limits are
so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy: "We asked, in other
words, whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound
of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless. " 88
The Court concluded that inflation was mostly irrelevant:
"the issue ... cannot be truncated to a narrow question about
the power of the dollar, but must go to the power to mount a
campaign with all the dollars likely to be forthcoming. " 89
This new test will be exceedingly difficult for challengers to
meet. How low would a contribution limit have to be before it is
"pointless?" Even a $100 contribution limit in many cases would
allow the candidate to raise enough funds to get a message out
through leaflets, faxes, and e-mails to media outlets. Leafleting,
faxing, and sending e-mail may not be the most effective ways to
campaign, but they are not "pointless." Moreover, "political association" would not necessarily be "ineffective" even if no
money could be contributed to political campaigns; people
would find ways to associate that did not require expenditure of
campaign funds. 90 The Court appears to be saying that so long
as an average candidate could run a decent campaign within the
challenged contribution limits, the amount of the limits meet the
constitutional standard. Such evidence would counter a claim
that the contribution limits imposed a "system of suppressed political advocacy," even if less popular candidates would lack resources to compete effectively.

87. !d. at 909 (emphasis added).
88. !d.
89. !d.
90. Volunteer time, for example. docs not count as a contribution under the FECA.
Sec Buckley v. Va/eo, 424 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding limitations on
volunteers' incidental expenses).
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B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, each wrote concurring opinions. Justice Stevens wrote
briefly to express his view that "[m]oney is property; it is not
91
speech." He argued that the "right to use one's own money to
hire gladiators, or to fund 'speech by proxy,' certainly merits significant constitutional protection. These property rights, however, are not entitled to the same protection as the right to say
what one pleases." 92
Although Justice Stevens did not indicate in his Shrink Missouri concurrence precisely how far he would go toward allowing
greater campaign finance regulation, he did so indicate in his dissent in the Colorado Republican case. There, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, he wrote, "I believe the Government has an important
interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the
cost of federal campaigns. " 93
Justice Breyer, in a Shrink Missouri concurring opinion
joined by Justice Ginsburg, indicated a strong willingness to allow greater campaign finance regulation than contemplated by
Buckley. At bottom, Justice Breyer, like Justice Stevens in
Colorado Republican, indicated an acceptance of an equality rationale for campaign finance reform. He faulted the dissent for
not seeing that "constitutionally protected interests lie on both
sides of the legal equation." 94
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern-not because
money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech ....
On the other hand, restrictions upon the amount any one individual can contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process- the means through
which a free society democratically translates political speech

91. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring). For an early skeptical view of the equivalence of money and speech by a judge who was on the lower court
panel deciding Buckley, sec J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001 (1976). For a recent exploration more sympathetic to the position that money is speech, sec Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 Geo. L.J. 45 (1997).
92. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604,649 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also expressed deference to
Congress's judgment in this area, id. at 650, something Justice Breyer echoed in his
Shrink Missouri concurring opinion. Sec infra note 97.
94. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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into concrete governmental action. Moreover, by limiting the
size of the largest contributions, such restrictions aim to
democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear
on the electoral process. In doing so, they seek to build public
confidence in that process and broaden the base of a candidate's meaningful financial support, encouraging the public
participation and open discussion that the First Amendment
9
itself presupposes.

Perhaps most tellingly, Justice Breyer remarked that the
statement in Buckley rejecting as "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment" an equality rationale for campaign finance reform
"cannot be taken literally. " 96 Applying his standard to the facts
of the Shrink Missouri case, Justice Breyer concluded, "I agree
that the legislature understands the problem- the threat to electoral integrity, the need for democratization- better than do
we." 97
C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Kennedy in his dissent indicated that he too would
overrule Buckley, but in the other direction-to disallow any
campaign contribution limits. Justice Kennedy argued that it
"mocks the First Amendment" that "[i]ssue advocacy, like soft
money, is unrestricted, while straightforward speech in the form
of financial contributions paid to a candidate, speech subject to
full disclosure and prompt evaluation by the public, is not." 98 He
stated his general agreement with Justice Thomas's dissent and
remarked that the Buckley "halfway-house" should be eliminated. He nonetheless expressly left open "the possibility that
Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which
there are some limits on both expenditures and contributions,
thus permitting officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on official duties rather than fundraising. " 99 Justice Kennedy thus appeared to endorse tentatively, though without citation, Professor Blasi's argument that candidate time-protection
is a compelling interest to justify campaign finance reform. 100

95. Id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 912 (Breyer, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 913 (Breyer, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendmellt After All, 94 Colum. L. Rev.
1281 (1994 ).
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Justice Thomas's position in his Shrink Missouri dissent was
scarcely in doubt, as he had already indicated in his Colorado
Republican concurrence that he wished to overrule Buckley's
tolerance of any campaign finance limits. This time, joined by
Justice Scalia (who had declined to join that portion of Justice
Thomas's Colorado Republican concurrence calling for Buckley
101
to be overruled ), Justice Thomas wrote that he "would subject
campaign contribution limitations to strict scrutiny, under which
Missouri's contribution limits are patently unconstitutional." 102
Justice Thomas spent much of his opinion criticizing Buckley's relative tolerance of contribution limits. 103 The remainder
of his opinion criticized the Shrink Missouri majority for further
weakening the test for the constitutionality of contribution limits.to4
III. TWO READINGS OF SHRINK MISSOURI AND THE
FUTURE OF "THE THING THAT WOULDN'T LEAVE"
A. INTRODUCfiON
Part II demonstrated that the Court in Shrink Missouri had
four choices to make in reading those parts of Buckley dealing
with campaign contributions. In confronting each of these four
choices, the Shrink Missouri Court interpreted Buckley to allow
for greater, rather than lesser, state regulation of campaign contributions.
Such a result was not foreordained. For example, the Court
could have said that the paltry evidence presented in the district
court- the affidavit of the state legislator regarding the "potential" for vote buying-simply was not enough to show that the
problem of the quid pro quo really existed or that voters believed that it did. The message would have been, as it appears to
be in certain other First Amendment cases, 105 that next time leg101. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join Part II of Justice Thomas's opinion. Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 631. Part II called for Buckley to be
overruled.
\02. Shrink Missouri, 120 S. Ct. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 917-23.
104. !d. at 923-27.
\05. Sec Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 632-33. The Court also has
been inconsistent in its treatment of the evidentiary issue in its recent federalism cases.
Compare United Scates v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,562 (1995) (suggesting Congress needed
more evidence of a substantial effect on commerce to justify law under Commerce
Clause power), with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (dismissing Congres-
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islators will have a better chance of success if they make the legislative findings necessary to support the law.
Alternatively, the Court could have seized on the language
in Buckley regarding "exacting scrutiny" and demanded a
greater fit between the ends (prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption) and the means (campaign contribution limits). The Court also could have given more teeth to the
Buckley language about not preventing candidates and political
associations from amassing the resources necessary for effective
advocacy by requiring trial courts to conduct evidentiary hear.
.
106
mgs
on t h e Issue.
That the Court did not do so is perhaps unsurprising. Even
if the Shrink Missouri Court had struck down the Missouri limits
without a wholesale rewriting of Buckley, it thereby would have
called into question most state and local campaign contribution
limits and the FECA $1,000 limits as well. 107 The question remains, however, whether the case has greater significance in
terms of the Court's willingness to tolerate other campaign finance regulations, especially two other major campaign finance
issues, expenditure limitations and regulation of so-called "issue
advocacy."
Buckley struck down three kinds of expenditure limits: (1)
restrictions on independent expenditures; (2) restrictions on
candidate spending of personal wealth; and
restrictions on
the total amount of spending by a candidate. 1 8 Buckley also
drew a sharp distinction between express advocacy for or against
a candidate, which could be subject to contribution limits and
disclosure of expenditures, and issue advocacy. In drawing the
line, Buckley limited the reach of electoral regulation to only
"expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the

(3J

sional evidence of a substantial effect of violence against women on commerce as irrelevant). Sec also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 639-40 (2000) (suggesting Congress must supply evidence to support its exercise of power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 US 507,525-27 (1997) (same).
106. For example, the district court in National Black Police Ass'n (discussed above
in note 22) conducted a trial and made detailed findings on this issue. 924 F. Supp. 270
(D.D.C. 1996).
107. Sec Hasen, Nat'! L.J. at A21 (cited in note 29); see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
108. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 39-51, 5!-54, 54-59 (1976) (per curiam). I focus
below on the first of these restrictions. For an argument that restrictions on candidate
spending of personal wealth help prevent the corruption of their opponents, see E.
Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in "Faulty Assumptions": A Response to Professor Smith's Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 867 (1998).
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election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate," 109 such as
advertisements saying "vote for," "elect,'' or "defeat" a candidate.110
B. TWO READINGS

One reading of Shrink Missouri is that it portends no
change from the Buckley regime (other than loosening the standards for approval of contribution limits). The Shrink Missouri
majority opinion went out of its way to argue numerous times
that its reasoning and analysis is consistent with Buckley. 111 Despite urging by the dissenting Justices, the majority refused to
reconsider Buckley itself because "we are supposed to decide
this case. Shrink and Fredman did not request that Buckley be
overruled." 112 It concluded that " [t ]here is no reason in logic or
evidence to doubt the sufficiency of Buckley to govern this case
in support of the Missouri statute." 113
Under this reading, the Court will not be more hospitable to
expenditure limitations or relaxed definitions of issue advocacy.
As for expenditure limitations, Buckley concluded and Colorado
Republican recently reaffirmed that expenditure limitations are
constitutionally infirm. 114 Moreover, nothing in Shrink Missouri
explicitly considered regulation of expenditures or issue advocacy.
The other reading of Shrink Missouri is that the Court is
disingenuous in its claims of deep fidelity to Buckley. Had the
Court faced only one of the four issues and resolved it in a way
more favorable to regulation, we might chalk it up to coincidence. But the Court faced four choices and resolved each
choice in a pro-regulation manner. Thus, although the Court
went out of its way to show congruence with Buckley, it also

109. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
110. !d. at 44 n.52. The Court in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,248-50 (1986), appeared to slightly expand the definition of
express advocacy. For a look at the jurisprudence of issue advocacy regulation in greater
depth, see Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77
Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1755-63 (1999).
Ill. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 901, 905, 906, 909, 910
(2000).
112. !d. at 909.
113. !d. at 910.
114. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 47; Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
Federal Electio~ Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 615 (1996). But sec Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding limitation on corporate expenditures in candidate campaigns).
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went out of its way to make it easier to sustain contribution limits. It would be far from impossible for a Court majority more
sympathetic to campaign finance regulation to draw upon parts
of its Shrink Missouri opinion to allow greater regulation of
campaign expenditures and issue advocacy.
Consider, for example, the television advertisements that a
supporter of George W. Bush, Sam Wyly, ran in a few select
television markets last March where Bush was competing
fiercely for the Republican Party's presidential nomination with
Senator John McCain. The advertisements never expressly
urged a vote for Bush or a vote against McCain 115 although that
was their clear intent; 116 instead, they criticized McCain's environmental record. 117 Wyly spent $2.5 million on these advertisements,118 which were especially controversial before WylX
voluntarily disclosed that he was the one paying for them. 1 9
These advertisements did not count as contributions to the Bush
campaign because they were produced independent of the campaign. Furthermore, the advertisements, lacking the magic
words like "vote for" or "vote against," fell outside the scope of
the FECA's disclosure provisions for express advocacy.
Suppose Congress, citing the Wyly advertisements, passed a
law regulating such advertisements. Congress could redefine
"express advocacy" or electioneering to include "any broadcast
from a television or radio broadcast station which refers to a
clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and is made
within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary
election and that is broadcast to the relevant electorate for that
office. 120 It could then subject independent expenditures to dollar limitations, as the FECA did before that portion of it was
struck down. 121 A Supreme Court hospitable to such a new law

115. For a transcript and critique, sec Richard Pcrcz-Pciia, Air of Mystery Clouds
Shot at McCain, N.Y. Times Al5 (Mar. 3, 2000).
116. "Mr. Wyly [who paid for the ads] said that ·of course' he hoped the commercials
would benefit Mr. Bush." Richard W. Stevenson with Richard Pcrez-Peiia Wealthv
Texan Says He Bought Anti-McCain Ads, NY. Times AI. AIO (Mar. 4, 2000). '
·
117. Perez-Peiia, Air of Mystery Clouds Shot at McCain at Al5 (cited in note 115).
118. Stevenson, Wealthy Texan Says He Bought Anti-AfcCain Ads at AI (cited in
note 116).
119. Pcrez-Peiia, Air of Mystery Clouds Shot at McCain at AIS (cited in note 115).
120. This language appeared in an earlier version of the McCain- Feingold campaign
finance bill. Sec S. 26, 106th Cong. § 201 (I 999), available at 1999 CONG. U.S. S. 26
Westlaw CONG-BILLTXT database.
121. Sec Joel M. Gora, Buckley~·. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 Akron L. Rev. 7 (1999) (comparing the McCain-Feingold bill and other modern attempts to
regulate campaign finances with the campaign finance regime in the FECA as the Court
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could say that Buckley's decisions regarding expenditures and
issue advocacy were made under the pressure of the 1976 election, before there had been an opportunity to gather evidence on
the corruption and the appearance of corruption stemming from
independent expenditures 122 and before those engaged in
electioneering routinely evaded the FECA through
electioneering that did not mention the magic words like "vote
for" or "vote against." The Court could then say that evidence
now demonstrates that such expenditures are meant to influence
the outcome of electoral campaigns. Further, even absent
evidence of coordination, voters may believe that Wyly will "call
the tune" for Bush; no proof of a quid pro quo is required under
Shrink Missouri, only the possibility that Bush might be "too
compliant" with the interests of his benefactor.
The Court might not require much evidence from Congress
if it believed these claims were "neither novel nor implausible."123 Perhaps it would be enough to point to a New York
Times profile of Wyly in which the Texas director of consumer
group Public Citizen recounted how Wyly, who has an interest in
a company investing in renewable energy, had offered to help
convince Governor Bush to include a provision in an energy bill
requiring that certain coal plants reduce their pollution. The director said "the episode 'is a crystalline example of what donors
get from Bush for their contributions-an opportunity to make
their pitch. ,,~ 24
The Court would not even need to expressly overrule Buckley to uphold this new federal law; instead, it could distinguish
Buckley on grounds that new evidence is available that was not
available in Buckley that would justify a law even under Buckley's strict scrutiny-like standard for expenditures. But the practical effect of such a ruling would be to overrule Buckley in favor
struck down in Buckley).
122. Consider the following statement from the Court's opinion in Federal Election
Comm 'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985):
It is of course hypothetically possible here [with PAC expenditures), as in the
case of the independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candtdates may
take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages. But here, as
in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the
value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby allevtates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from
the candidates. On this record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more.
123. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC. 120 S. Ct. 897,906 (2000).
124. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., with Richard Pcrez-Peiia, Role in Ads Pws Focus on
Bush Friend, N.Y. Times A16 (Mar. 6, 2000).
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of greater regulation. Of course, the Court could get there as
well by accepting equality as_ a compelling interest to justify
campaign finance regulation.m Three Justices have signed on to
this view, 126 but there may not be two more votes for this position. The former path seems more likely, therefore, if the Court
is to move in this direction.
C.

WHERE WILL THE COURT Go?

The two readings present dramatically different pictures of
where the Court might go with campaign finance regulation.
The first reading suggests that Buckley remains viable. The second reading suggests that "The Thing" will leave some time
soon.
In answering the question of which reading, if either, will
prevail, one can count noses on the Court or look at broader
trends. As far as counting noses, the answer depends in part on
changes in Supreme Court personnel. Three Justices (Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Stevens), all in the Shrink Missouri majority, already are on record supporting an equality rationale for campaign finance reform that is more hospitable to regulation. 127
They almost certainly would support the second reading of the
case.
Three Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas), all dissenting in Shrink Missouri, are on record that Buckley should be
overruled to disallow any limits on campaign finances beyond
disclosure. These Justices would not accept either reading of
Shrink Missouri but would instead throw it out along with the
rest of the Buckley jurisprudence. 128
That leaves three Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Souter) whose views on the two readings of
Shrink Missouri are less clear. Chief Justice Rehnquist's views
are perhaps the easiest of the three to decipher from past cases.
He joined in most of the Buckley opinion except for that part of
Buckley upholding unequal treatment for minor parties and independent candidates in the presidential public financing regime.129 He also has been a steadfast adherent to Buckley, ex125. I have advocated that the Court accept the equality interest as compelling. Sec
Hasen, 114 Cal. L. Rev. at 42 (cited in note 61).
126. Sec supra notes 93-97.
127. See id.
128. Sec supra notes 911-104.
129. Buckley v. Va/eo. 424 U.S. 1, 290-94 (1976) (Rchnquist, J., concurring in part
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cept insofar as he is willing to allow just about any regulation of
corporate campaign financing. 13° Finally, the Chief Justice
joined those portions of Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in
Colorado Republican that would have struck down the FECA's
party expenditure provision on grounds that there was no proof
of corruption as required by Buckley. 131 But he declined to join
that portion of Justice Thomas's opinion calling for Buckley to
be overruled. 132 Given this evidence, Chief Justice Rehnquist
probably would advocate the first reading of Shrink Missouri reaffirming Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures and not altering Buckley's position on issue advocacy.
Justices O'Connor and Souter recently have taken a cautious approach to campaign finance regulation. Both joined in
Justice Breyer's narrow plurality opinion in Colorado Republican refusing to examine the facial challenge to the FECA's party
expenditure provision. 133 Both Justices also declined to sign on
to Justice Breyer's more expansive concurring opinion in Shrink
Missouri recognizing equality as a worthy reason for campaign
finance regulation. Back in 1990, however, Justice O'Connor
joined in Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in the Austin case,
arguinfo against the majority's new, broader definition of corruption.13 This fact suggests that she would stick with Buckley. On
the other hand, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the Shrink
Missouri majority opinion shows that she has changed views
about how broadly to define corruption, 135 suggesting perhaps
that she would reconsider other aspects of Buckley as well.
As the Court stands constituted right now, there may or
may not be five Justices who would support the second reading
of Shrink Missouri, and there do not appear to be five Justices to

and dissenting in part).
130. See Briffault, 14 Const. Comm. at 125 n.121 (cited in note 4) ("Chief Justice
Rehnquist has consistently supported the Buckley framework, but has equally consistently made a special exception to permit restrictions on corporations.")
131. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 518
U.S. 604, 647-48 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
132. !d. at 631.
133. !d. at 604.
134. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 702 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. It appears Justice O'Connor (as well as Justice Scalia) changed views on the
meaning of corruption at least once before, by concurring in that portion of Massachusetts Citizens for Life that was consistent with Austin's broader view of corruption. See
Lowenstein, Election Law-Cases and Materials at 640 (cited in note 9) (asking "[c]an
Justice Scalia's and Justice O'Connor's dissenting posture in Austin be reconciled with
their joining in Part Ill( B) of the Court's opinion in MCFL'?").
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overrule Buckley to create a laissez faire campaign finance regime. This stalemate could well be broken in the next few years,
depending upon which Justices, if any, leave the Court and who
might replace them. I leave that question to fortunetellers and
the next presidential election.
Beyond nose-counting, it is difficult to imagine that the first
reading of Shrink Missouri is tenable because it is difficult to
imagine Buckley continuing as stable precedent for the foreseeable future. Current campaign finance reality has overtaken
136
Buckley's assumptions. The explosive 13rowth of soft money
7
and party and non-party issue advocacy has fundamentally altered the nature of (at least federal) campaigns.
Congress enacted public financing of presidential campaigns
at least partly to take presidential candidates out of the fundraising business. 138 But now these candidates spend much of their
time raising soft money, 139 which may dwarf the amount of public financing available to them. 140 Similarly, if current trends continue, we can expect "issue advocacy" to swamp campaign financing subject to the FECA during the current presidential
election campaign.
It is not as though a coherent federal campaign finance law
exists with a few loopholes. The loopholes have overtaken the
law itself. Regulating hard money but not soft money and express advocaci, but not issue advocacy may not "mock[ ]the First
Amendment" 41 as Justice Kennedy claims, but it certainly undermines any arguments that the FECA contribution limits currently in place serve a valid function. We have a campaign finance system moving ever closer to a mere illusion of regulation,
trapping only the unsophisticated contributors or spenders in a

136. Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Law, 100 Colum.
L. Rev. 620, 630-31 (2000) (describing explosion of party usc of soft money in the 1990s).
Soft money is money raised outside the FECA limits nominally for party building activities but actually supporting the party's candidates for federal office. Jill Abramson, The
Nation: The Hard Business of Soft Money, N.Y. Times, Week in Review 3 (Mar. 26,
2000). Soft money is outside the FECA because it is used to pay for things other than
express advocacy, like issue advocacy.
137. Briffault, 77 Texas L. Rev.· at 1761-62 (cited in note 110), reports that the Democratic National Committee coordinated $46 million in issue advocacy expenditures
with the Clinton-Gore '96 campaign.
138. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1996) (per curiam) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-689,
pp. 1-10 (1974)).
139. Abramson, The Nation at 3 (cited in note 136).
140. Sec Briffault, 77 Texas L. Rev. at 1760-62 (cited in note 110).
141. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 914 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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web of complex regulation. 142 Anyone with half a brain and a
good lawyer can get around just about all the limits, disclosures,
and rules to promote the candidates of his choice. 143
In the meantime, voters through the initiative process continue to pass campaign finance laws on the state and local level.
John McCain's campaign finance reform message in his campaign for the Republican Party's presidential nomination has put
the issue on the table for the other candidates. Voters do not
like the current system, but little can change while Buckley remains viable precedent.
In the end, the first reading of Shrink Missouri cannot be
sustained because the loophole-ridden system is nonsensical and
voters will continue to clamor for real change. Even assuming
Congress does not act on the federal level, voters, pushed by the
reform community, will continue to pass initiatives pushing the
edges of Buckley on the state and local level.
The pressures from voters and reformers who will continue
to challenge Buckley on the one hand, and the loophole-driven
campaign finance reality that undermines the Court's Buckley
structure on the other, suggest that something must give. Shrink
Missouri indicates that the Court is considering greater deference toward campaign finance regulation. But the position is
tentative and precarious. A change in just two key Justices could
bring the opposite result, an end to the constitutionality of any
campaign finance regulation besides disclosure. The forces of
change may soon overtake the forces of inertia, but the direction
of change remains uncertain. 144

142. For a district court's detailed factual findings demonstrating how the current
federal campaign finance system allows easy evasion, see Mariani v. United States, 80 F.
Supp. 2d 352 (M.D. Pa. 1999). For further proceedings. sec Mariani v. Federal Election
Commission. 212 F.3d 761 (3rd Cir. 2000), ccrt. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3363 (2000).
143. Sec Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Comribwions and Expendiwre Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 265 (2000).
144. We may learn a bit more about how the current Court views campaign regulation this Term. As this Article went to press, the Court granted certiorari in FEC v.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign, 2000 WL 1201886 (No. 00-191, Oct. 10, 2000)
[Colorado Republican II]. The case presents the question whether parties should be exempt from contribution limits when they coordinate their spending with candidates; such
coordinated spending is treated as a contribution to a candidate. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441 a(a)(7)(B)(i). The Colorado Republican Party argues that political parties do not
pose the same danger of corruption as other individuals and entities do, and therefore it
is unconstitutional to limit party contributions to candidates. Regardless of how the current Court decides Colorado Republican II, the underlying tensions in campaign finance
doctrine explained in the Article likely will remain to be llcshcd out by the Court in a
future case that more directly concerns the continuing vitality of Buckley.
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"The Thing," a.k.a. Buckley, will leave America's living
room. The remaining question is who will come visit in its place.
If the next guest will stay for 25 years or more, the Court had
better get it right this time.

